The Obama administration’s call for a probe into the killing of Muammar Gaddafi reflects a great deal of cynicism. The eight-month-long NATO war, launched apparently to help fulfill the democratic aspirations of Libyans, has been, in fact, waged with the aim of installing a client regime that would service America’s interests more than fulfill the democratic aspirations of the people.
The saga of the US-NATO involvement in the Libyan war of liberation started with anti-Gaddafi dissidents’ plan to observe February 17 as a “day of rage.” On February 15, security forces had arrested a prominent lawyer named Fathi Terbil, who had represented families of some of the 1,200 prisoners massacred by Libyan security forces at the Abu Slim prison in 1996. Terbil set up a webcam overlooking Benghazi’s main square, where some of the families had been protesting. With the help of exiled Libyan in Canada and around the world, the video spread rapidly on the Internet.
Amid widespread demonstrations on Tripoli roads that sometimes turned violent, NATO entered the conflict on March 19, after UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted authorising military intervention to protect civilians. Ironically, the same day 40 Yemeni protesters were killed by sniper fire of President Saleh’s brutal security forces and a day before, the Bahraini security forces of King Khalifa shot, clubbed and brutally cleared peaceful protesters from the Pearl Square in Manama who were demanding only moderate Constitutional reforms. But the UNSC chose to ignore these tragedies.
Despite many US State Department proclamations that American interests lie in promoting the creation of democratic governments around the world, it is established that US power has at times supported oppressive regimes.
In a situation eerily similar to the current Libyan one, George Kennan, the originator of the Truman Doctrine, said, during the US military intervention in Iran in 1953, that he was not too bothered about the rest of Iran as long as the oil fields were under US control. The situation in Libya is not too different at present.
This is why at a time when American political leaders feel compelled to advocate budget cuts to reduce the deficit and when polls show Americans solidly and increasingly opposed the war, the US Government spent huge sums of money to fight war on behalf of Libyans.
There is no doubt that the supreme national interest of America lay in controlling Libya’s oil, not bringing democracy to Libyans. Libya has one of the biggest and most proven oil reserves — 43.6 billion barrels — outside Saudi Arabia.
From 1954 until 971, the US enjoyed a profitable presence in Libya through the Wheelus Air Force Base, then widely dubbed “Little America” on the shores of the Mediterranean sea. In exchange for the airfield, the US gave impoverished Libyans an average of $2 million per year, besides other aid that was already being provided. From 1959, when Libya became an oil producer, till 1986, US oil companies made considerable profits under the rule of authoritarian King Idris I. But after Gaddafi’s 1969 coup, US-Libya relations became increasingly strained because of the latter’s foreign policies supporting international terrorism and subversion of moderate Arab and African governments.
However, in 2004, President George W Bush unexpectedly lifted economic sanctions on Libya in return for its renunciation of nuclear weapons and America-alleged terrorism. There was a burst of optimism among American oil executives eager to return to the Libyan oil fields they had been forced to abandon two decades earlier. But later, Gaddafi progressively hampered the interests of the US and Western oil companies by demanding a greater share of profits and other concessions. Gaddafi even forced oil companies to give their local subsidiaries Libyan names. Eni became Mellita, and the Spanish firm Repsol became Akakoss. Oil firms were pressed to hire Libyan managers and local human resource. It grew to such a level that some of those corporations were mulling that it may no longer be profitable or worthwhile to drill for oil in Libya.
Upset over not getting US Government respect and recognition for his earlier concessions, Gaddafi pressured the oil companies to influence US policies. This did not go down well with the US administration. Moreover, the growing Libyan resource nationalism was considered a larger threat to the US interests.
In his 2006 speech marking the founding of his regime, Gaddafi was quoted as saying: “Oil companies are controlled by foreigners who have made millions from them. Now, Libyans must take their place to profit from this money.” This renewed the old manoeuvring of the US to do away with Gaddafi. As early as 1969, Henry Kissinger revealed in his memoirs, that discussions were held within the US Government about covert action to assassinate Gaddafi, largely because of his radical Arab nationalism, his interference with US-Saudi control over OPEC oil policies and his closing down of the Pentagon’s biggest airbase on the African continent. In 1986, the Reagan administration carried out the US bombing of Gaddafi’s Tripoli compound. And, in the 1990s, Britain’s intelligence service, MI6, conspired with Islamist elements in a bid to kill him.
Oil politics has always produced incredible equation in the Arab-US relations. The then Egyptian President Sadat persuaded the late Saudi King Faisal to threaten to withhold oil from the West to gain political advantage of the growing dependence of the industrialised West on Arab oil. And the tactic was effective. Soon the major American oil companies backed the Arab cause in public, and privately worked to weaken US support for Israel. But it was also in US favour, as money generated from Saudi oil sales to the US often translates into Saudi arms purchases from US weapons dealers. The US participation in the Libyan democratic movement has indeed improved its image after it got ruined by campaigns like the one in Afghanistan. However, going by the character of the US, it is certain that it would extract the cost of the support from the new government in Libya. The National Transitional Council (NTC), which led this democratic upsurge in Libya, is now busy in formulating foreign policy instead of addressing pressing internal problems like mistrust among the masses. The Misratans, the Zintanis, the Amazighs all are on Tripoli’s streets brandishing their weapons, because they are afraid of each other.
What will happen to the high hopes of Libyans from the NTC is vague, but what is certain is that the new regime will be forced to renew the oil contract to the US companies. Last month, representatives of the rebel coalition in Benghazi spoke to the US-Libya Business Council in Washington, reiterating their promise of giving more oil contracts.
The saga of the US-NATO involvement in the Libyan war of liberation started with anti-Gaddafi dissidents’ plan to observe February 17 as a “day of rage.” On February 15, security forces had arrested a prominent lawyer named Fathi Terbil, who had represented families of some of the 1,200 prisoners massacred by Libyan security forces at the Abu Slim prison in 1996. Terbil set up a webcam overlooking Benghazi’s main square, where some of the families had been protesting. With the help of exiled Libyan in Canada and around the world, the video spread rapidly on the Internet.
Amid widespread demonstrations on Tripoli roads that sometimes turned violent, NATO entered the conflict on March 19, after UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted authorising military intervention to protect civilians. Ironically, the same day 40 Yemeni protesters were killed by sniper fire of President Saleh’s brutal security forces and a day before, the Bahraini security forces of King Khalifa shot, clubbed and brutally cleared peaceful protesters from the Pearl Square in Manama who were demanding only moderate Constitutional reforms. But the UNSC chose to ignore these tragedies.
Despite many US State Department proclamations that American interests lie in promoting the creation of democratic governments around the world, it is established that US power has at times supported oppressive regimes.
In a situation eerily similar to the current Libyan one, George Kennan, the originator of the Truman Doctrine, said, during the US military intervention in Iran in 1953, that he was not too bothered about the rest of Iran as long as the oil fields were under US control. The situation in Libya is not too different at present.
This is why at a time when American political leaders feel compelled to advocate budget cuts to reduce the deficit and when polls show Americans solidly and increasingly opposed the war, the US Government spent huge sums of money to fight war on behalf of Libyans.
There is no doubt that the supreme national interest of America lay in controlling Libya’s oil, not bringing democracy to Libyans. Libya has one of the biggest and most proven oil reserves — 43.6 billion barrels — outside Saudi Arabia.
From 1954 until 971, the US enjoyed a profitable presence in Libya through the Wheelus Air Force Base, then widely dubbed “Little America” on the shores of the Mediterranean sea. In exchange for the airfield, the US gave impoverished Libyans an average of $2 million per year, besides other aid that was already being provided. From 1959, when Libya became an oil producer, till 1986, US oil companies made considerable profits under the rule of authoritarian King Idris I. But after Gaddafi’s 1969 coup, US-Libya relations became increasingly strained because of the latter’s foreign policies supporting international terrorism and subversion of moderate Arab and African governments.
However, in 2004, President George W Bush unexpectedly lifted economic sanctions on Libya in return for its renunciation of nuclear weapons and America-alleged terrorism. There was a burst of optimism among American oil executives eager to return to the Libyan oil fields they had been forced to abandon two decades earlier. But later, Gaddafi progressively hampered the interests of the US and Western oil companies by demanding a greater share of profits and other concessions. Gaddafi even forced oil companies to give their local subsidiaries Libyan names. Eni became Mellita, and the Spanish firm Repsol became Akakoss. Oil firms were pressed to hire Libyan managers and local human resource. It grew to such a level that some of those corporations were mulling that it may no longer be profitable or worthwhile to drill for oil in Libya.
Upset over not getting US Government respect and recognition for his earlier concessions, Gaddafi pressured the oil companies to influence US policies. This did not go down well with the US administration. Moreover, the growing Libyan resource nationalism was considered a larger threat to the US interests.
In his 2006 speech marking the founding of his regime, Gaddafi was quoted as saying: “Oil companies are controlled by foreigners who have made millions from them. Now, Libyans must take their place to profit from this money.” This renewed the old manoeuvring of the US to do away with Gaddafi. As early as 1969, Henry Kissinger revealed in his memoirs, that discussions were held within the US Government about covert action to assassinate Gaddafi, largely because of his radical Arab nationalism, his interference with US-Saudi control over OPEC oil policies and his closing down of the Pentagon’s biggest airbase on the African continent. In 1986, the Reagan administration carried out the US bombing of Gaddafi’s Tripoli compound. And, in the 1990s, Britain’s intelligence service, MI6, conspired with Islamist elements in a bid to kill him.
Oil politics has always produced incredible equation in the Arab-US relations. The then Egyptian President Sadat persuaded the late Saudi King Faisal to threaten to withhold oil from the West to gain political advantage of the growing dependence of the industrialised West on Arab oil. And the tactic was effective. Soon the major American oil companies backed the Arab cause in public, and privately worked to weaken US support for Israel. But it was also in US favour, as money generated from Saudi oil sales to the US often translates into Saudi arms purchases from US weapons dealers. The US participation in the Libyan democratic movement has indeed improved its image after it got ruined by campaigns like the one in Afghanistan. However, going by the character of the US, it is certain that it would extract the cost of the support from the new government in Libya. The National Transitional Council (NTC), which led this democratic upsurge in Libya, is now busy in formulating foreign policy instead of addressing pressing internal problems like mistrust among the masses. The Misratans, the Zintanis, the Amazighs all are on Tripoli’s streets brandishing their weapons, because they are afraid of each other.
What will happen to the high hopes of Libyans from the NTC is vague, but what is certain is that the new regime will be forced to renew the oil contract to the US companies. Last month, representatives of the rebel coalition in Benghazi spoke to the US-Libya Business Council in Washington, reiterating their promise of giving more oil contracts.
Source: The Pioneer
