Oken Jeet Sandham
For nearly three decades, the Naga people have lived with the promise of peace. Yet, 29 years after the present phase of negotiations began, the political settlement remains elusive. What started as a hopeful departure from armed conflict has gradually become a prolonged process marked by delay, ambiguity, and unresolved contradictions.
The present phase of the peace process began in 1997, when the Government of India signed a ceasefire with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM). The agreement generated cautious optimism, with many believing that dialogue would finally replace decades of bloodshed. However, the relief was mixed, as another major Naga group, the NSCN-K, was initially excluded. This gap was addressed four years later, when the Government of India also signed a ceasefire with the NSCN-K in 2001. This was not India’s first attempt at negotiating peace. The 1997 ceasefire came 33 years after an earlier agreement signed in 1964 between New Delhi and the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN).
That first ceasefire collapsed in 1972 after the sixth round of talks, reportedly when the Government of India abrogated the agreement. Armed conflict between Indian security forces and the Naga Army resumed with greater intensity. The continued violence culminated in the Shillong Accord of 1975. Rather than resolving the crisis, the accord divided the Naga movement. Prominent NNC leaders — Isak Chishi Swu, S.S. Khaplang, and Thuingaleng Muivah — rejected the agreement and later formed the NSCN in 1980. Isak Swu became Chairman, Khaplang Vice Chairman, and Muivah General Secretary.
Internal conflict followed soon after. In 1988, the NSCN split into two factions: NSCN (IM), led by Swu and Muivah, and NSCN (K), led by Khaplang. The split unleashed years of large-scale factional violence that claimed thousands of lives. Entire communities were caught between rival armed groups, and fear became a part of everyday life.
It was civil society that eventually stepped in where political leadership failed. Churches, tribal bodies, and citizens’ groups organised peace rallies and appealed to the factions to recognise their shared cause. These efforts led to the formation of the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) in 2008. Through confidence-building initiatives — including symbolic football matches between rival groups and civil society teams — the FNR helped restore communication among the factions. The result was dramatic: factional violence fell sharply, and for the first time in decades, a sense of normalcy returned.
When the BJP-led NDA government assumed power in 2014, public optimism resurfaced. Both major Naga groups, the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN (K), were already under ceasefire. Several rounds of dialogue had taken place during the previous UPA government’s tenure. Many hoped the new government would accelerate the process and move towards a final settlement.
Instead, the NSCN (K) walked away from the ceasefire in March 2015. This moment exposed a critical failure in the government’s approach. While holding substantive talks with the NSCN (IM), New Delhi sidelined the NSCN (K) despite its ceasefire status. For 14 years — from 2001 to 2015 — the NSCN (K) had maintained peace with the Government of India, yet received no serious engagement in return.
Later that year, the government signed a Framework Agreement with the NSCN (IM) on 3 August 2015. This was followed by the signing of an Agreed Position with the Working Committee of Naga National Political Groups (WC-NNPGs) on 17 November 2017. Both developments were presented as milestones. Finally, on 31 October 2019, the Government of India announced that talks with the Naga groups had concluded.
Yet, more than seven years later, there is still no agreement in the public domain. This is the central paradox of the Naga peace process: the talks are said to be over, but no one knows what has been agreed upon. The government maintains that it is consulting States of the Northeast and stakeholders. However, how long can a process remain “concluded” without any visible outcome?
The uncertainty has only deepened over time. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, now in his third term, has yet to clarify the status of the concluded talks. Meanwhile, the Nagaland government continues to seek reassurances from New Delhi. At the same time, the NSCN (IM) has denied that the talks were ever truly concluded, raising further questions about the government’s claims.
Recently, Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio led a high-level delegation to New Delhi and met senior central leaders, including Union Home Minister Amit Shah, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. Members of Parliament from Nagaland also participated as part of the Political Affairs Committee sub-committee. It was reiterated that the Indo-Naga talks were held at the highest political level and that appointing an interlocutor of ministerial or political rank was necessary to expedite an honourable settlement. The Home Minister reportedly responded positively, indicating that a Minister of State and senior officials would be assigned to handle the process.
Despite these assurances, the core issue remains unresolved. The Nagaland government is forced to keep seeking reassurances, while the people are left in the dark.
Peace cannot survive in silence. The Naga people are not asking for new negotiations; they are only asking for honesty and transparency. If an agreement exists, it must be shared. If there are obstacles, they must be clearly stated.
After 29 years, delay is no longer a strategy — it is a failure. The real question is not whether a solution is possible, but whether there has been the political will to deliver one. The Naga people deserve clarity, dignity, and closure. Only then can true peace begin.
