Dr. K. Hoshi
Phek
With by-election to Lok Sabha for Nagaland Parliament constituency already announced for May 28, 2018, the issue of tampering Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) comes alive again. In India, the Parliament passed an enabling law in 1988 making the use of EVMs as constitutionally valid. The Election Commission of India (ECI) commissioned EVM in 1989. ECI first used EVM in 1999. Now, EVM is used country wide in all elections.
India’s choice for EVM was primarily on cost cutting on paper ballot printing and faster counting. The fact that EVM’s shelf-life 15 years only and its cost per unit escalated to Rs.12,000 or US$180 in 2017 belied cost cutting benefit. The fact that the process of either electronic counting or paper ballot counting took whole day proved nothing but the height of stupidity and absurdity on faster counting alibi.
Since its first use, there were claims of EVM tampering and its security related issues. Technical experts alleged and even demonstrated live, that EVM being essentially a computer with a clock, it could be manipulated with malware, rigging devices and software programs. Experts also said that the software and hardware in the EVM is vulnerable to tampering during manufacturing, transport, storage and at the booth. Somebody challenged the use of EVM in present form. After the rulings of the Delhi High Court and Supreme Court and demands from various political parties, ECI introduced EVMs with Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) system in 2014. ECI introduced VVPAT as if all problems to EVM will be over with VVPAT. Experts said, “VVPAT provides essentially no security unless they are used to check the machines”. VVPATS attached to Indian EVMs provide facility, primarily to verify a vote cast only. ECI gave long list of technical and administrative arguments to buttress that Indian EVM is tamper-proof. Interestingly, ECI admitted two things, consciously or unconsciously –
(1) That, it would require pretty high-tech skills to tamper EVM (2) That, for tampering of the EVMs to occur, one will need physical access to EVMs and that, it would be very difficult even to get hold of a machine to tamper with it”.
These are not only weak arguments but also went on to prove that ECI too supported and validated the theory that EVMs could be tampered with, if given physical access to high-tech skills. None can deny that there are no dearths of high-tech skills across the world, including India. As far as physical access is concerned, there are human handlers of the machine at different levels. First is at the manufacturing level (designers and manufacturers), second at ECI level (ECI’s EVM engineers and administration), third at the district returning officer (DRO)’s level (EVM engineers/technicians and administration) and lastly, at the Presiding Officer’s level in the polling booth. Even if ECI’s claim of EVM’s invincibility is accepted in principle, there still remains the ‘Human Error’ factor. Any mishandling/corruption at any of those levels reflects human error. There can be no mechanism to eliminate this human error completely. This is so, because the handlers of the machine (administrative and technical) are not immune to temptations that others are susceptible. All human beings are equally vulnerable. Nobody can guarantee that the handlers are completely insulated. If allegations of tampering were proved right, the fates of many candidates would be decided by a handler, particularly the EVM engineer/technician, just by the click of a mouse. I said engineer/technician because he is the last person with the software code at the time of installation at DRO level. The franchise right of hundreds and thousands of voters may be compromised or violated. At the booth level, past experiences had shown that in a case of booth capture, the Presiding Officer and security personnel were completely over-powered. A single voter could press the ballot button in which, the Presiding Officer genuinely had no choice or in other cases, he was in connivance to allow such malpractices. In democracy, power lies in the hands of electors. Elector’s power is in his vote. It comes in a package of election. That power in election does not end with voting but with counting of votes. The fact that EVM is vulnerable to manipulation during manufacture, transportation and storage, raises the benefit of doubt on VVPAT. That is because, as of now, ECI has not mandated simultaneous parallel counting of votes in the EVM and VVPAT slips of all the polling booths. (In last assembly election, ECI mandated counting of VVPAT slips in one polling booth only, in a constituency). In paper ballot system, the voter can rest assure that the physical form of his vote will remain intact and crosschecked if required, during or after counting. In electronic system, the voter cannot see his/her vote in physical form. His/her vote may be manipulated at any stage from voting to counting. An ideal VVPAT should have twin objectives – one, to enable the voter verify the vote he/she had cast and two, to check the machine’s reliability. Since ECI has not mandated parallel counting of votes in EVM and VVPAT slips simultaneously for all polling booths, the second objective remains defeated. In a scenario where the voter has no opportunity to guarantee safe passage of his/her vote that was cast, until the end of election process, his/her democratic adult franchise power is actually rendered powerless. The fact that one person or group(s) of persons may manipulate votes at any stage of election process is a dangerous precedent for democracy. A day may be here that elections may become just an affair of a single person and the machines (EVM) that he is assigned to operate. It may take away democratic adult suffrage/franchise rights of the people. Power has already gone into the hands of corrupt people. Absolute power will go into the hands of those corrupt who can afford to buy the equally corrupt handlers of the machines. Together, they will steal the rights of the people. The human error in machine’s handlers and administrators will beget despotic leaders, giving rise to absolutism that will replace finally democracy. In true democratic set up, the adult suffrage/franchise’ right of the people should not be placed at the mercy of the devil’s box. Neither, should it be at the mercy of administrative controllers and technical operators of the machine. It should lie in people’s own hands. The best way to safeguard democracy is to use paper ballots that voters can see at the time of voting as well as counting. In many developed democratic countries, people lost confidence in electronic voting machines because it threatened their democracy. They reverted to paper ballot system. Will India take a queue? If not, there is no more hope for vibrant democracy in India because excessively relying on a machine will dehumanize elections.
(This is a personal opinion and in no way reflect the views of the political party this writer belongs).
