The Nagaland government’s recent Memorandum of Understanding with the State Bank of India (SBI) marks the rollout of a new salary-linked insurance scheme for permanent government employees. Framed as part of the State Government Salary Package (SGSP), it promises accidental insurance cover up to Rs 2.1 crore, disability support, child education benefits, and family-linked savings coverage—all reportedly at no direct cost to the employee.
Its arrival, however, is shaped by the memory of another, much larger scheme that continues to face serious setbacks. The Chief Minister’s Health Insurance Scheme (CMHIS), intended to provide cashless health coverage to all households in Nagaland, has over the past year been defined more by conflict than care.
Private hospitals suspended services multiple times, citing months-long delays in claim settlements. Disputes over alleged fraudulent claims—raised by the insurer, Future Generali India Insurance—led to the withholding of payments. Hospitals and the Nagaland Health Protection Society (NHPS) countered that many of the flagged claims had already been verified. Between shifting documentation demands, inconsistent communication, and missing grievance redressal systems, the scheme faltered. For patients, this meant being turned away at hospital gates with valid CMHIS cards but no functional cover.
In June 2025, the Gauhati High Court’s Kohima Bench ordered the insurer to settle all pending claims from the 2024–25 period within four weeks. It was a legal recognition of the gridlock that had paralyzed service delivery.
The SBI MoU enters this landscape. While no conclusions can be drawn about its performance—the scheme is still new—its design is notably different. Structured around salary accounts, routed through an established banking network, and pre-integrated with account holders, it reflects a move away from the more fragmented public-private insurance model used in CMHIS.
That shift in structure is significant. Where CMHIS relied on a chain of approvals, third-party assessments, and contested documentation, the new salary-linked package appears to consolidate process within a single institutional framework. In doing so, it suggests a different kind of partnership—one built not around service providers but around financial systems that are designed to manage flows of funds and account-level entitlements.
While the two schemes serve different populations, the contrast they present is telling. In the case of CMHIS, design flaws and delivery failures have eroded public confidence. The SBI MoU, by contrast, enters quietly but carries with it an expectation—whether intended or not—of a more stable and accountable rollout.
In the end, the effectiveness of any welfare program rests not just on what is promised, but on what is delivered, and how reliably.
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