Do Negotiations Work?

In the last decade, we have seen the birth of two new countries, East Timor and Kosovo; both of which gained their independence not through negotiations but through internal processes where people sturdily asserted their call for independence with the active support and lobbying efforts of western countries. Irrespective of the super powers’ divided responses to Kosovo’s historic independence declaration as the 193rd independent country in the world, it is imperative for the international community to visit the politics of peace negotiations. Both of these countries’ participatory processes have proven to be more inclusive than negotiations which are usually more exclusive. While it remains uncertain whether Kosovo would fare better than East Timor in their reconstruction process to establish human security and political stability, it is certain that both Kosovo and East Timor have affected global politics and have definitely changed the face of the world map.

Within this same time frame, the international community has borne witness to the continuing failure of a number of critical peace negotiations, some of which have entirely collapsed and returned to war, while others are on the brink of resuming armed confrontation after having reached an impasse. The inability of the Israel-Palestinian peace process to arrive at a political settlement after years of negotiations has further destabilized the middle-east region; and the recent breakdown of the Sri Lankan-Tamil Tigers’ peace process brokered by the Norwegians has pushed the region into further chaos. Both these processes had been projected as possible ‘road maps’ by the international community; only to fail miserably. These failures seriously question the ability of negotiations as a method to solve political issues of injustice.

The Indo-Naga peace process is another example which in its tenth year has become the longest political negotiation in the region with no definite end in sight. The recent statement of the National Security Advisor (NSA) to the Prime Minister of India MK Narayanan that the Indo-Naga peace talks have “slowed down” and that it can make a forward movement “only” if the NSCN (IM) agrees “to accept a solution within the broad parameters of Indian Union” will only cast shadows on the peace process. The NSA’s affirmation that Delhi is ready to give “broad concessions” to the Nagas in which a “new arrangement for the Naga people with the maximum autonomy and freedom” can be worked out but “under the Indian Union” is ambiguous and will lead to further complications.

The NSA’s statement points to four broadly related implications. First, contrary to public perception that India has shifted away from its traditional position vis-à-vis the Naga political question, the position reflected in the statement indicates that India has not made any shift towards accommodating the rights of the Nagas. It has only created new ways of reaffirming and imposing a solution that will not be honorable. Second, though the central principle in the bi-lateral understanding that underlines the negotiations emphasizes that the talks will be “unconditional” the insistence that a solution can be reached only within the parameters of Indian Union indicates that India has belied and undermined the principles of the talks.

Thirdly, it’s a historical fact and a political reality that Nagas refused to be part of the Indian Union during the formation of the Indian state, and the contention that the solution should be within the scope of the Indian Union becomes ahistorical and apolitical. In order for the talks to progress it is absolutely essential that the political status of the Nagas needs to not only recognize the rights of the Nagas, but also ensure the political space where such rights can be exercised. It is in this context that the idea of outside-the-box solution becomes relevant; to ignore such an idea would only cause further distrust. The fourth and final implication is a sum-total of the above three points; that while India is quite satisfied to continue the ceasefire, it is not sufficiently prepared to move from ceasefire to solution. In other words, India is content as long as it can “manage” the situation. One can conclude that India’s intent is therefore conflict management, not conflict resolution or transformation of the situation. Is India therefore a willing and equal peace partner?

These implications have generated serious dilemmas. While eagerly extending the ceasefire on one hand, and causing a political impasse on the other hand, a stalemate has been created in which the situation can go neither backwards nor forwards. A negotiation process that once began optimistically moving forward, and as a possibility towards resolving a long standing protracted conflict, has now reached a stage wherein the players are now in a deadlock that is slowly draining their strength. It will require immense will and political courage on the part of the NSCN (IM) to be more creative, accommodating and imaginative in its thinking to wriggle itself out of this deadlock. The NSCN (IM) needs to reach out and talk to all the Naga factions and the Naga public so that a common understanding can build the Naga future.

To break the impasse which is suffocating the Nagas, the best option at this present time is to bury their divisions and to break from times in the past which have caused vicious cycles of hurt, anger and violence towards each other. The Naga political narrative must relocate itself and focus on political issues which will define the dignity and well-being of the future, and not on events that imprison the Nagas to its past. 
 



Support The Morung Express.
Your Contributions Matter
Click Here