Moa Jamir
Article 371A should not be scapegoated for governance failure
In recent times, Article 371A, the Special Constitutional Provision pertaining to the State of Nagaland, has been unfairly designated as a hindrance to the State's progress. It is portrayed as the main culprit behind project delays, developmental challenges, and related issues. While such sentiments have long circulated within the power corridors of Nagaland, they are now becoming more vocalised.
For instance, on January 19, Nagaland's lone Member of Parliament in the Lok Sabha, Tokheho Yepthomi, expressed his wish for the Government of India (GoI) to "do away with Article 371(A) so that we can develop our state at par with the rest of other states in the country." Amid criticism over the statement, he reiterated his ‘personal view’ that Article 371(A) impedes development in the state. Whether his assertion was influenced by the end of his tenure in the present Lok Sabha remains unclear.
Meanwhile, few day alter, a top official of the State Department of Power attributed Nagaland's power supply issues to the misuse of Article 371(A) and opined that it obstructs infrastructure development.
Article 371(A) was inserted into Part XXI of the Constitution as a special provision with respect to the State of Nagaland when it gained statehood through the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1962.
It essentially states that “(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,— (a) no Act of Parliament in respect of— (i) religious or social practices of the Nagas, (ii) Naga customary law and procedure, (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law, (iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides…”
Despite ambiguity in the political process that followed, the governance and polity of the State have largely been guided by these constitutional rights, preserving the Naga identity to a significant extent. However, land issues, especially for roads and other infrastructure development, have been contentious for many projects. The recurrence of such issues, though, is more attributable to administrative incompetencies and governance failures than anything else.
Take, for example, the issue of land for road projects, particularly the right of ways for National Highways, a highly litigated matter. It becomes apparent that it is the failure of the State Government or its agencies to deal with the issue holistically. The onus of land acquisition falls on the State Government but if the concerned authority gains the confidence of villages, communities, or other organisations, it becomes a resolvable issue. This holds true for other projects or infrastructural developments, where negotiation and public interest should prevail.
Pre-consultations and confidence-building measures are key to overcoming potential obstructions, not making announcements first and then spending a significant amount of time holding 'consultative meetings' when things do not pan out as assumed.
Therefore, the Special Constitutional Provisions, conferred after many struggles, should not be made a scapegoat for lack of political acumen, policy failures, mis-governance, incompetence and at times sheer sheer negligence. Besides, if needed, the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland has the option to bypass the provisions. Perhaps, the issue is being tested in the public domain to enable the Assembly to bring a new land law, as suggested periodically by some in the present dispensation.
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