Aheli Moitra
Last year, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) broke a 17-year ceasefire with the Government of Myanmar. In the same year, the Government of Myanmar was hit by the reform bug.
In tune with the reforms, led by President Thein Sein, the government released hundreds of prisoners, relaxed censorship of media and signed agreements with a number of “rebel groups”. This included a truce with S.S. Khaplang’s NSCN.
Jubilation followed. Sanctions were suspended, and democracy elected to parliament. The US appointed its first ambassador to the state in 22 years. Multi-billion multi-national companies were brought in for the first time. Scenarios were observed and some contracts signed. Civil war in Myanmar was delegated to history books, peace was ushered in.
Skepticism, however, remained a grand old friend. Everyone ‘hoped for the best but prepared for the worst’, as Aung San Suu Kyi expressed.
The Kachins chose to continue fighting the state in a bid for better political rights and control over land/water resources. They have maintained that a ceasefire alone will not do; there needs to be a political dialogue through ethnic alliance. Importantly, the KIA claimed that the government had used the ceasefire period to sign multi-billion energy deals with China, without any consultation at the local end. This year the fighting intensified after the Burmese Army advanced on some KIA outposts.
The Irrawaddy magazine reported another alarm this year. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has raised doubts over the Government of Myanmar’s peace talks, observing what has been happening in the northernmost Kachin State. Business interests behind the peace talks are being increasingly discussed, reported Irrawaddy. Many KNLA officials seem to be of the view that “government development projects are behind ceasefire negotiations which draw pragmatic leaders into pacts”. These “shaky business deals”, as journalist Bertil Lintner put it, will not work.
Those observing the ceasefire on the Indian side of the border may find similar trends. Though Article 371(a) is no “shaky business deal”, it isn’t a progressive political maneuver either. But it does go beyond a ceasefire. If we are to consider the 1997 ceasefire, it cannot be ascertained how strong each of the factions has become during this period. Similarly, it cannot be ascertained if a rights-based thinking has become stronger or more progressive.
That internal bickering has weakened the groups, there can be no doubt. Most of this time has seen the rule of a Naga political party that has claimed to show solidarity, and sensitivity, to its people. But allegations are rife that Naga civil and political organizations, to the grassroots, have been pulled into pragmatic pacts with the state.
India, in turn, has used this relevantly peaceful space given to it by its inveterate “rebels” (the Nagas) to progress a little more towards Naypyidaw. China will not like this pressure, also from the US, and surely use its political cunning to draw self-deterministic outfits into the geopolitical party this game is set to become.
With its old ties with the Chinese, how the Nagas, now in ceasefires with both India and Myanmar, are pulled into the game remains to be seen.
