Joseph Kuba
Nothing has yet been made public about the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act 1958 Review Committee recommendations. Staying in Delhi and with gossips going round, one cannot, however, fail to speculate the nature of the recommendations of the Review Committee. A lot of the gossip has revolved around certain official statements emanating from political bigwigs. Much also has to do with India’s escalation in the fight against ‘terrorists’. One thing that India certainly cannot do is: escalate its counter-terrorist/insurgency policies, and at the same time, say or give the impression that it is cutting down on its legal and other institutional mechanisms against terrorists/insurgents.
Going a little back into time, it must be understood that the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act 1958 was brought about as a ‘military’ response to internal violence of all types in an evolving anti-terror/insurgency doctrine that overwhelmingly was influenced by the need for India to be continually prepared for war from its hostile neighbours. When I say all types of violence, this also included the Left-wing mass movement in Telengana and other areas, which Jawaharlal Nehru, in a speech, termed as an “anti-national campaign, worse than an open rebellion and aiming at total disruption, which would result in widespread chaos”. Although the Left-wing militant mass movement was a sore area, as far as the government was concerned, the real threat emerged from ‘rebellion’ in the peripheral East and the West. The escalating violence in these two geo-political and strategically significant regions, for whatever reasons, came to be perceived as a direct challenge to the notion of a hard won independence and the territorial integrity of the new India. The need to face these challenges by all means available was made a matter of national policy. Fighting terrorism/insurgency, thus, was made an important element in the overall national military grand strategy of India and not as policy of engagement with a specific type of violence practitioners.
This also can be evidenced from the fact that the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act 1958, when enacted, was to lapse in six months but it has been continually extended for the last 48 years with its variants formulated in various other circumstances which also means that the counter-terror/insurgency doctrine/policy of the government has seen no innovation since its inception. This overt military disposition right from the 1950s has created a military/bureaucracy enclave who make the final ‘rules’ in counter-terror/insurgency with the political leadership in Delhi having little or no knowledge or say of/in the operational aspects carried out in the field. This acute polarization of India’s anti-terror/insurgency policy will not be an easy structure to demolish in the near future.
As far as I am concerned, repealing the Armed Forces Act would require a complete overhauling of the national/internal security institutional, legal and other mechanisms, which I am afraid the government is not in a position to carry out. Not because it cannot be done, but because the policy is so deeply entrenched in the system. Further, with subsequent governments managing to hold on to power in what seems to be ‘coalition politics is here to stay’, the pulls and pressures of political partners will make it extremely difficult for governments to commit political suicide by taking ‘risks’ pertaining to India’s ‘national security’.
What inferences do I draw from the above regarding the impending recommendations of the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act 1958 Review Committee?
Crudely put, the government will not repeal the Act. At most what the government will do is strike out some portions to say that it is benevolently presenting a more ‘humane’ Act. It might even change the nomenclature, but the fundamentals of a ‘military’ oriented response to terrorism/insurgency will not be compromised. This also falls in line with both the enhanced rhetoric and commitments to the ‘war on terror’ in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks in the United States. A number of recent literature coming from research by the Army top brass are emphasizing on ‘joint doctrines’, short, swift and precise military operations to fight different types of conflicts and in varying terrain patterns, smaller, more agile, more responsive and rapidly deployable Special Forces Units, patterned on Units such as the 31 Rashtriya Rifles – an elite counter insurgency force – and such other renewed counter terror/insurgency strategies. Bad news indeed for the states in the North Eastern region.
For us living the North Eastern states all the rhetoric of ‘political dialogues’ are not ‘chill out’ signs. Where will the BSF pulled out from Jammu and Kashmir go? They are definitely not going to be deployed for maritime security duties. One other concern that needs to be noted: there has been a gradual but consistent isolation of the political leadership in the North Eastern states in any move by the Centre to carry out its military policies in the region. There is a general perception in Delhi that politicians in the region are highly susceptible to influence from the protagonists of conflict and hence the Centre derives no dividends in collaborating with them. The recent Bhutan operation reported caught the Assam government off guard making one Assamese security analyst comment that the success of Operation Rhino II was completely reversed by Operation All Clear.
Political interventions have always been a ‘far cry’ for the people in the North Eastern states. Not because these have not been carried out but because these have always been on terms set by the Centre in a fundamentally ‘carrot or stick’ approach. Unfortunately for Delhi, both the ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ do not seem to have worked in the region. And of course, wishing away the problem is only a recipe for disaster.
