Aheli Moitra
The rotting Tipaimukh Dam project, and protest against, is symptomatic of a larger disease. Its site located near the Manipur-Mizoram border, in Churachandpur district, the project is slated to produce 1500MW of electricity and take care of the flood devastation caused by the River Barak in large tracts of Assam (Silchar, Cachar, Karimganj). It will, of course, produce the regular short and long term devastation that dams generally do. The electricity produced will not be available at subsidized rates for people of Manipur, will be located in a volatile seismological zone, will bring in a barrage of migrant labour that will work for near negligible wages for big contractors from outside the region without meaningfully employing locals and, most importantly, submerge a major portion of the Zeliangrong Naga land in Tamenglong district in Manipur.
On behalf of the Nagas, the NPMHR have taken a stand against the project for a long time, and entities like ZUF are bound to stand up for the existential crises the dam puts the Zeliangrongs in. However, since the conflict between Nagas and Kukis heightened in the 90s, the Nagas have not been able to take up active protest in the region itself. As a result of the 90s, many Rongmei Nagas had to migrate away from Churachandpur while many Kukis from Ukhrul and Tamenglong had to migrate in leading to clashes between them and Paites for resources. Churachandpur district is consisted predominantly of non Naga tribes- Kuki, Hmar, Paite, Zoumi among others. The Naga and non Naga tribes have shared a love-hate relationship through history. The latter consider themselves closer to the Mizos but through unfortunate historical packages (like the Mizo Accord), have found themselves segregated. Being a part of the Manipur state, though, created for them the same debacle the Nagas find themselves in— marginalization from the polity, under development and possible assimilation into an unknown culture. Being the majority tribe, the Nagas should have formulated a policy to accommodate the smaller tribes— spread over Churachandpur, Chandel and Sadar Hills—into the alternative administrative arrangement they’ve been proposing. The autonomy of administration, without ruffling the Meitei sentiment of territorial integrity, of the hills and valley is seen to be a solution conducive by all tribes and sections within the Meitei intelligentsia.
But the Nagas remained confused. According to a Churachandpur-based commentator, “their policy was to tell the non Naga tribes to first be a part of the Naga movement, then embrace the Naga identity and later think of how to sort out the problem of the tribes together.” The second clause is unacceptable to the non Naga tribes who see little cultural affinity with the Nagas and faulty nomenclature, according to them, has lost them historical opportunities even with the Mizos. That apart, these tribes are against the Naga policy of first boycotting the electoral process but later succumbing to it anyway. The Nagas boycotted the Member of District Council (MBC) elections in May 2010, while the non Naga tribes went ahead and elected Congress MBCs (mostly because only Congress defied UNC’s boycott call) to Chandel (50-50 Kuki Naga populace), Churachandpur and Sadar Hills. This, they believe, was necessary because even if the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) are responsible to the state, at least some form of autonomy could be achieved through the use of this institution, which has been lying in coma for the past 20 years, while the bigger debate on more autonomy is handled in the assembly. The solution has to come step at a time. The Nagas, according to them, want to bang one big nail in and take care of the situation. Since the central Naga issue revolves around integration of Naga inhabited lands, the boycott strategy made sense to the Nagas at the time. This difference in strategy has widened the gap between the Naga and non Naga tribes. Going in for the state legislative assembly election now is seen to be a contradiction on the part of the Nagas.
This perception could create difficulty in land protection. For instance, even if the Naga National Groups wants to bar construction activities at the Tipaimukh site, it will be difficult because Churachandpur is nowhere near their zone of influence. If the centre starts moving construction material down the Barak, there will be nothing left to do, but if the Jiribam-Tipaimukh state highway is used, some steps could be taken—none possible without a friendly shake with the non Naga tribes with a collaborated effort from the Naga National Groups (nationalist level), UNC (civil society level) and NPF (political level).
The non Naga tribes cannot be fooled or bulldozed over. To back them are 18 different armed groups in Churachandpur district alone. The larger umbrella groups, in a Suspension of Operation (SOO) with the government of Manipur, have their own MLAs in the assembly—underground decisions deeply affect over ground politics in the whole region. Due to their long standing seat holding in the assembly, and leadership coming under question, people from non Naga tribes will try to create a power balance if ECI mechanisms are applied, booth capturing taken care of and non-tampering of EVMs. They will use the electoral process to their advantage. The Nagas, with the NPF, could do the same if the cards are played tactfully.
This is the first time that the Nagas, through over ground politics, have reached out to the southern Nagas. The Mizos, on the other hand, have already made an attempt to ally with the tribes in Churachandpur. In the larger quest for a greater Mizo or greater Naga nation, it will be the intelligent play of politics that will decide the future of the region. This is not to suggest that one is pitted against the other, but rather that the Nagas and the Mizos could take a lead to address the issues of indigenous peoples in the region, not by assimilating the minority tribes, but giving them enough autonomy, simultaneously creating alliances that go beyond the nationalist discourse to achieve a more stable rights-based alliance.
The first step, if Nagas are to initiate this, would be to lead the autonomy of administration (through ADCs) from the government of Manipur which can be achieved more effectively by being in the opposition than in ruling. This should be done (as the Nagas have now realized) from within than without because the centre will refrain from interfering in state matters unless the suggestion comes from the state assembly itself.
Hypothetically speaking, if at least 6 NPF candidates get elected, being in rule (with the use of “coalition” politics, as Rio defines it) would be useless as only 2 Nagas will be a part of the 12 member cabinet, 2 non Nagas being the other tribal MLAs on the cabinet. It will be next to impossible to convince the 8 Meitei cabinet ministers to start discussing the issue of administrative autonomy/separation—the Meiteis are well aware that territorial separation, historically, is an eventual outcome of administrative autonomy and separation. However, if these 6 elected NPF MLAs are to be in the opposition, they could have a united voice to bring about a more effective change from within, considering that NPF has given tickets to candidates who are not just willing, but are also able, to tackle the Naga integration issue without losing sight of the minorities in the region. The electoral process, in that sense, will not just be a “referendum” on the Naga integration issue but, more significantly, a testing ground for the NPF’s political intelligence to create conditions of peace in the region with all tribes involved—this will pave the way for unforeseen strategies to tackle the Tipaimukh Dam issue, and others, connected to indigenous peoples’ rights.
