Retrospection on the faceoff in Doklam Plateau 

K Haralu Daragapathar, Dimapur  A couple of months back, I had written an article titled `faceoff in Doklam Plateau’ in a local daily. Despite limited knowledge of Military or Diplomatic matters, I venture to write this piece again on the same issue, based on information available in the public domain, with the hope that the article will evoke some interests in the minds of the younger generation on matters like current affairs, Geography,  international studies etc.  So here goes....   The faceoff between India and China in Doklam plateau which started in mid June thankfully came to a close on 28<sup>th</sup> August. The incident gave the electronic media of both countries a field day of reporting/misreporting for 73 days. While the rhetoric was a little subdued on the Indian side, India was bombarded with threats of dire consequences by the Chinese media and their officials every day during the crisis. The end to the faceoff is being viewed by many in India as a diplomatic victory for the Central Government. They say India called China’s bluff and it appears that it was China who blinked first and India managed to embarrass China at several levels. Some may say it was `Karma’, others may give credit to bravery of the Indian soldiers. I feel that finally it boiled down to economics and geo politics. With a trade surplus of 54 billion USD (with India), China could not afford to jeopardise its own struggling economy. China also needs India’s support for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) and a free run of its Vessels to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East for Oil.   Since there was no shooting match, it was considered a draw but both sides lost because of the rhetoric which came out during the period of tension. It was the EU who spoke up first for withdrawal of troops by China. Putin said the 1962 war was because of utter foolishness of Zhao en Lai. Final message came from Trump saying India has to play a pivotal role in relation to Afghanistan. Trump’s message was - if the fiasco unfolds into something bigger, then the US would side with India. Effectively, China was getting isolated and it could no longer afford to antagonise India. Besides, if the standoff continued till October, the entire region would be snowed in and the Chinese would be forced to pull out. So as a face saving move, China called for a truce. `Quite Diplomacy’ seemed to have worked in favour of India this time.   I belong to the generation born in the fifties. As children, we had seen the impact of the 1962 war with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan on civilian life – black outs, food shortages, curfews, running for shelter on hearing Air raid Siren, propaganda leaflets, news from All India Radio and so on. Many of us kids found the experience both scary and exciting. Having experienced all these in the earlier wars, I was curious to find out how well India was prepared to face China this time round, should there be another war. The Defence Minister’s comment that `India of today is not the same as the India of 1962’ did not give us much comfort or assurance because, the Chinese have also not been simply meditating in the Himalayas for the past 55 years. In the last 20 years, both India and China have grown to become economic Giants. While India`s GDP has seen a steady growth, China’s growth has been more phenomenal reaching a high of 14.2 % in 2007. Along with this, their military strength and capability has grown many times over.   While I do not in any way mean to undermine the capability of the Indian Army, it is pertinent to note the observations of Meghnad Desai, noted commentator on international affairs who remarked `If a war breaks out, you will be facing one of the finest army in the world. You should not equate PLA with the Pakistani Army’. He goes on to say that it is important to understand the Chinese thought process because they are much more nationalistic, militaristic and aggressive. Personally, I feel that under the communist regime, failure will not be an option for any Chinese Commander. Incidentally, every soldier of the PLA owes allegiance to the CCP or the Chinese Communist Party before anything else and the party controls the Army with an iron fist. I was amused by the comments of an Indian Army commander during the crisis, who stated that taller Sikhs and Jats were being deployed in the area of conflict to intimidate the Chinese Army. To my mind, if bullets started flying, then taller guys would be easier targets.   Experts were of the view that if there was a full scale war, this would be fought in several fronts. Though they had not elaborated on these `fronts’, possibly the points of engagement would be:

• Through the Chinese provincial road S201 leading towards Walong in Arunachal, which follows the Lohit river valley where some Battles were fought in 1962
• Through the Siang river valley. However, the terrain here is very harsh and not favourable for a Chinese aggression.
• Tawang region: The provincial road S202 leads to two zones in this area. The Bum La pass and Tagla ridge. The Chinese Defence installation here is heavily built, complete with Helipads, Hospitals, reinforced Barracks. The Chinese base near Bum la has locational advantage of height and they can launch major offensive from here as they did in 1962, reaching as far as Tezpur and India faced a major defeat. This is the most vulnerable spot for India in the North East.
• Nathula & Doklam region: S204 leads to this region. At Nathula, India has the locationl advantage since this area overlooks the Chumbi valley and the S204. However, if the Chinese manage to dominate the Doklam plateau by taking over Doko La and Gymochem, it will be a different ball game, because then the Siliguri corridor or the `Chicken’s neck’ will be within Artillery range of the PLA.
• Barahoti area of Uttarkhand: There is no access for the Chinese Army in this region, however they conduct patrols through Helicopters in this area.
• Sindhu or Indus river valley: Here, the Chinese have built an airfield on the river bed and military camps in this area.
• Pangong lake in Ladakh: Out here India controls the western part of the lake and China controls the other side.
• Aksai Chin: For the Chinese, this region presently is too remote to carry on a sustained warfare.

    The issue in Doklam:

• An area of 270 sq km is disputed between Bhutan and China in Doklam area.
• In mid June Indian Army blocked PLA`s road construction activity in the disputed area “to protect Bhutan’s territorial interests”, resulting in jostling by the two Armies which was shown both on TV and in social media. This had resulted in a standoff. No shots had been fired.
• China responded by blocking the Nathu La route to Kailash – Mansarovar, a destination in Tibet/China for Indian pilgrims.

  Status during the crisis:

• China made talks conditional on troops withdrawal by India
• India wanted both parties to first withdraw their troops to commence talks.
• Both sides were intent on the show of strength.

  Outside of India, it is widely believed that India wants to keep Bhutan under its thumb. Even if the Chinese are at fault, China is left with no option but to pursue hard options when it was denied by India to establish diplomatic relations with Bhutan. It may be noted that under the `Friendship agreement’, India is responsible for the defence and Foreign affairs of Bhutan.   According to Stobdam, a former Indian Ambassador :

• The Chinese had offered a much larger area to the North in exchange of the disputed Doklam area to Bhutan, which India did not agree to.
• Last time Indian agencies were accused of interfering in the Bhutan elections and that the present Government came to power because of the role played by India. China has been using this as a tool to cause a rift between India and Bhutan.
• The road construction started on 16^th Reaction from the Bhutanese Foreign Ministry came on June 29. Why did it take so long for the Bhutanese to react?
• Compared to the Indian side, there seems to be closer coordination between the Chinese Defence Ministry and Foreign Ministry.
• There is confusion on the boundary line and tri junction, with the Chinese maps giving their side of the claim, but we are not very clear. My guess is that there was some kind of a goof up.
• The days of buying loyalty with economic aid may be coming to an end.

  During a press conference on 4^th August, to the question “The Chinese officials claim that India was informed of the Road construction plans on 12^th May and again on 8^th June, why did India deploy its troops without first giving a reply to the Chinese”, the official spokesman of GOI Mr Gopal Baglay replied that it is not proper for him to 'characterise the contents of Diplomatic interactions’. To another question of whether Bhutan had specifically asked for India’s intervention regarding Doklam issue, Baglay was evasive again saying `India has very special relations with Bhutan and the two countries work together very closely’. Even to an amateur, the replies sounded very unconvincing. In fact you are left wondering whether communication of the Chinese was lost in the sea of Indian red tapeism or was the Bureaucracy hoping the irritating problem would simply go away if the matter was delayed?  At least the Chinese were very clear in whatever they have to say or claim. No narratives. The observations of Mr Stobdan and comments of Mr Baglay raises doubts about the capability of Indian Diplomacy and efficiency in handling crisis situation.   Why Indo-China relations are strained in recent times? China:

• Blocking India’s Nuclear ambitions- Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) membership
• Supporting Pakistan for entry into NSG and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
• Block listing of Masood Azhar in the UN list of terrorists.

India: Collaborating with US, Japan and S.Korea in the Indo Pacific region

• India’s posture in the South China Sea
• Fanning Tibetan secessionism
• India’s strong Opposition to China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)

  Besides this, the Chinese Communist party’s 19^th party Congress was coming up in November and it was important for President Xi to assert his authority, and not show weakness to dissidents in the party. China is also nervous about India’s growing power in the sea, particularly in:   Madagascar: A listening post of the Indian Navy became operational in 2007. This station provides electronic eyes & ears in the SW Indian Ocean.   Maldives: India has set up Radar station in all 26 atolls of the Maldives and networked with Indian coastal Radar system. Indian coast guards patrol Maldivian waters for its security.   Mozambique: The Indian Navy took charge of Mozambique sea security to keep Piracy in check.   Seychelles: The Indian Navy patrols the Exclusive economic zone of Seychelles to check piracy. Oman: India has set up a Naval Airbase in Muscat and the Navy has berthing rights in the Port of Oman.   Qatar: India has a defence co-operation pact with Qatar.   Tajikistan: Indian Airforce’s only active foreign base is located in Farkhor Airbase in Tajikistan.   Vietnam: India is setting up satellite tracking and imaging centre in Southern Vietnam that will allow Hanoi access to pictures from Indian earth observation satellites that cover China and South China Sea.   Aside from its Naval bases in the mainland, India is also developing a strong Naval and Military base in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands.   China can not secure dominance in the South China Sea without expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean. A blockade of the Strait of Malaca by US and its allies can also cut off China from Middle East oil supplies. Therefore China’s increasing show of power in the South China Sea. This is also the reason for China’s urgency to build the CPEC as an alternative route to the port of Qadar in Pakistan to have access to the strait of Hormuz and for the same reason the India- US co-operation is also of strategic importance to offset China’s dominance in South China Sea and its Geo political theory of the `String of Pearls’   The Tibetan Plateau With an average elevation of 14,800 ft above sea level, the world had seen the `Roof of the world’ to be a desolate place, incapable of supporting much life. There is also hardly any vegetation in the Tibetan plateau. However, Tibet is the source of several rivers in Asia, like the Indus, Ganga or Ganges, Tsangpo, the Mekong, Salween, Irrawadi, Yangtse and the Yellow river. In its unsatiable thirst for Electricity, China has built multiple Dams on the Yangtse and Tsangpo rivers. The Tsangpo also known as Lohit in Arunachal is the main tributary of the Brahmaputra. Other tributaries like the Subansiri and Siang also originates from Tibet. While India has a water sharing treaty with Pakistan, it has no such arrangement with China. According to Assam Govt, the amount of rainfall the State witnessed in 2017 does not stand proportionate to the 3^rd wave of floods this year. While the  first two waves this year were caused by heavy rainfall in Arunachal and Assam, magnitude of the 3^rd wave of floods and the rainfall within India did not co-relate. There are apprehensions that it may have to do with release of water by China. Is China trying to send some kind of signals to India through its control of waters?  According to Assam Govt, while India and China have an agreement to share Hydrological data, China has not shared any data this year. The latest episode is about the crystal clear water of river Siang in northern Arunachal turning dark black. The water is not fit to drink and a lot of Fish have died. It is understood that the cause of this phenomenon is due to activities north of the Mc Mohan line.   I would like to conclude today’s writing with a few questions:

• Where exactly was ground zero of the faceoff?, name of place or still better, Geo reference.
• Did Bhutan Government formally ask for India’s assistance or was it a decision taken at local level in response to a situation? Are local officials (Indian) authorised to take such decisions which involve intervention by a foreign country?
• Is India’s heavy reliance on defence cooperation with the US on sound footing, given the unpredictable nature of President Trump?
• The Finance Minister Mr Jaitley had been holding `Additional charge’ of Defence throughout the period of tension. Why was the post of Defence Minister not given adequate importance or attention for a long time seeing that Jaitley was already struggling with the numerous reforms and changes taking place under the Finance Ministry.
• Does India need to change its stance and attitude towards its smaller neighbours considering that it is generally viewed as the neighbourhood 'bully’?