Vaprümu Demo
Upper Agri, Kohima
The hard fact of the matter that the precondition talk between the NSCN (IM) and the GOI - not to tread on (nay forego) (a) Naga Sovereignty (b) Naga Integration and (c) not to involve the other factions in the current talk - will eventually conclude in an honorable solution maybe rather premature or pre-judgmental at this fragile stage considering the exclusion of the two inherent Naga issues (a & b) and the more numerous factions. Whatsoever, the anticipated settlement reached between the negotiating parties or thereafter claimed as laudable achievement ‘outside the Constitution of India’ will however not be the first of its kind in Naga politics. That actually will be the second time some kind of settlement or agreement is made ‘outside the Constitution’, the first been the 16 Point Agreement and similarly, also surely the ensuing provisions will be subsequently incorporated into elevated Special Provision of Art 371(A) for Nagaland and likely parallel provision for the Nagas in Manipur.
What is otherwise better known and largely accepted as 16 Point Agreement was indeed a Memorandum submitted by the Naga People’s Convention to the GOI, on the very foundation of which Nagaland statehood was first created under the Union of India and thereafter substantial portion of the memorandum was incorporated as Special Provision under Art 371(A) of the Constitution of India. Be it a memorandum, the 16 Point was a no nonsense political document/statement which had characterized as well as legitimized the peculiarity of the Naga issue now rephrased as the uniqueness of Naga history and situation; a reality duly accredited by the GOI. Had it not been so the GOI would not have, for some other fanciful reason created a small Nagaland statehood in the remote corner of the northeast India at that premature point of time or in the rarest of its kind in Indian politics placed Nagaland State under the External Affairs Ministry. It does matter seriously even now that despite the difficulty rather the unwillingness to concede to, particularly Naga integration mainly due to political sensitivity rather than the so-called neighbors’ consensual requirement of the present day excuse, the 16 Point had at least registered/recorded the genuine political aspiration of the one time united Nagas. And so long as the 16 Point Agreement is partially fulfilled the Nagas have every legitimate reason and right to demand the non-fulfilled provision (integration) for the very fact that altogether these are the specific terms & conditions the GOI had tacitly assured to consider, either steadily or gradually and fundamental reason for which Nagaland conceded to become a constituent unit of the Indian Union. Only that for half a century the Naga national workers were too busy fighting and killing for full sovereignty (not integration), later amongst themselves for supremacy (not integration) never visualizing that some day some of them will be fighting a losing, rather a lose battle even on Naga integration.
What glaringly differentiates the NPC’s 16 Point Agreement from the current political negotiation for that matter from the NSCN (IM) charter of demand is the nature the former was publicly debated several years before final settlement and the latter (a culmination of 15 long years talk) was mysteriously and secretively submitted to the GOI, much to the nervousness of the actual stakeholders. The high claim that what they have done they have done so with the best intention and best possible option for the Naga people, the first by the over-ground leaders (without the underground) of the past and the second by one of the factions (without public knowledge) may not be totally misread in today’s reality since such solution had and can bring some benefit, if not lasting solution. The actual position worth pondering here is more of ‘what’ and not ‘how’ the settlement or agreement is going to be made outside and not within the existing constitutional framework because either way the projected provision of such settlement will ultimately be incorporated into the Constitution sooner or later. In other words, when Naga sovereignty and even Naga integration have been made a non-issue from day one of the actual negotiation (not peace talk) between the two parties there apparently is no necessity to argue or counter argue that the settlement or arrangement will be outside and not within the existing constitutional framework. At least one thing is very clear; such settlement will come within and not outside the Indian Union and therefore, the Constitution, whichever way it is amended is supreme.
It definitely matters though without much appreciation from the skeptics that 16 Point Agreement is the bedrock of the Special Provision under Art 371(A) which, technically and legally is an unchallengeable Mini-Constitution for the State of Nagaland. The ironical part of the Agreement is that the GOI has failed to sincerely honor the basic part of the Agreement which clearly fall within the purview of Art 2 & 3 (on establishment & formation of new state) for reason mentioned earlier, whereas the extra constitutional but extraordinary arrangement of Nagaland under External Affairs Ministry was arbitrarily and yet without protest withdrawn in 1972. All these happened because all this time, until recently 16 Point Agreement was treated as a political junk not worth fighting for. Only when its significance and relevance to the present Naga situation is realized we are being forced to swallow our own vomit by our next neighbors.
Nonetheless under the given situation knowing may have fewer problem of acceptance than not knowing at all. Knowing how talks is proceeding toward certain logical conclusion, be it outside the existing constitutional framework, it will inevitably end as an integral part of the Indian Constitution similar to the pattern of 16 Point Agreement vis-à-vis Art 371(A). The simple question is when 16 Point Agreement despite embodying Naga integration as an indispensable part of final Naga settlement could not be appreciated as honorable can any future settlement without Naga integration be differently honorable? One fails to understand the rationality of concealing what is bound to come out later as part of the constitutional provision. Is it the fear of public rejection before inking the agreement? But not knowing what exactly is being talked in a close door meeting of selected few reminds the outsiders of the parable of several blind men describing differently the physical parts of an elephant. Surprisingly, those in authority in Nagaland collectively opted to support the bilateral talk without knowing or bothering to know what actual demand is being submitted to the GOI for sanction. I mention ‘sanction’ because the GOI has nothing to demand and receive from the negotiating faction save compromise on sovereignty and integration and therefore, despite many other demands submitted whatever is give-able and workable will be given by the GOI to the NSCN (IM) and not the other way round. At least Ibobi Singh, the Chief Minister of Manipur has taken his logical stand that he cannot support or oppose what is not made known to the people for consideration. The NSCN (IM) recently stated that the ball is now in the court of GOI but on closer perusal we see that the latter has tossed the same ball into the court of Ibobi Singh without whose consent the matter said to be at the threshold maybe dragged further by the indecisive GOI. If this presupposition can become a reality than there is also every possibility that towards the end the day Ibobi Singh and none else may become the hero; rather the current process of Naga solution has made him a hero.
