If scarcity is the root of economic problems, profusion, certainly is not always a blessing. An economic problem arises not only because resources available are scarce in supply but also because human’s wants are unlimited. In similar tunes, a political deadlock could occur when too many politicians are chasing after too little cabinet portfolios.
Allocation of ministerial berths may not be that cumbersome in the first and second DAN government, but the headache became a toothache for Rio and his advisers when almost every district or tribal bodies starts demanding cabinet berths for their respective representative in DAN III. And even when cabinet portfolios has been allocated, dissensions compelled Rio to change his decision overnight switching portfolios between Veterans Noke and Kiyanille, and compensating the charismatic Nicky Kire and youthful Tovihoto with additional department.
In a multi lingual and tribal society like the Nagas, certain factors other than individuals’ efficiency and contribution has to be taken into account while allocating ministerial portfolios. The application of Gamson’s law (i.e., the proposition that coalition government will distribute portfolios in proportion to each member party’s contribution of seats to the coalition) to solve coalition politics is not sufficient as the challenge is not just about pleasing coalition partners but finding out a way to divide 12 cabinet ministerial seats among 17 recognised Naga tribes or 11 districts irrespective of whoever forms the government.
The Rengma’s wants their lone representative to be accommodated; the Pochury’s and the Khiamniungan’s demands better portfolio for their parliamentary secretaries, Dimapur and Kiphiri wants cabinet minister, the Lothas are unhappy with the allocation of Forest and border affairs to its lone minister, Mokokchung is not contented with two cabinet minister and Kohima is still grumbling even after getting the lion share. Given the circumstances, one does not wonder about the rumours for defections but thanks to the anti-defection law.
These problems arose because numbers became too much. NPF alone has 38 legislatures; addition from BJP and JD(U) makes it 40, plus 7 independents would make it 47 in a 60 member house. And all 47 of them want something bigger or better. Bargaining is politics, and it is an integral part of the democratic process for allocating public office or resources. The danger, however, lies on its outcome- the resulting allocation may not be Pareto-optimal, making all the parties worse off or dissatisfied. And unstable cabinet could lead to regime instability.
This could be related to the ‘paradox of plenty’ in economics which states that countries or regions with an abundance of natural resources tend to have less economic growth or worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources. This is hypothesized to happen either because of a decline in the competitiveness of other economic sectors, volatility of revenues from the natural resource sector due to exposure to global commodity market swings, government mismanagement of resources, or weak, ineffectual, unstable or corrupt institutions.
What then is the second best arrangement when plenty becomes problematic? Since ministries or portfolios are indivisible, there won’t be a perfect match of the claims of each individual or party and its allocation. Moreover, there are certain problems inherent to human nature, like envy or greed that are ineradicable, irrespective of whatever allocation procedure is used. Likewise, plotting for power, cheating and manipulating people are key elements in politics that erodes the quality of democratic decisions. Or even if decisions are made on sound judgment it is not necessary, nor expected, that it will please everyone.
In some other pluralist society, confessionalism is also seen as a means to address such related problems. In political parlance, confessionalism is a system of government that proportionally allocates political power among a country’s communities—whether religious or ethnic—according to their percentage of the population. Its advocates cite it as an effective way to secure peaceful co-existence among diverse religious and ethnic communities by empowering each according to its weight in the region.
However, as pointed out by critics, such a system may deepen misunderstanding between ethnic groups as the dominant groups may use government machinery to favour itself at the expense of other or even oppress other groups. Moreover, as demographics change, the positions and power held by a particular group may no longer appropriately reflect the size of that group.
A valid case in hand is the resentment expressed by the smaller tribes in Nagaland including the Rengma, Pochury, Khiamniungan and Yimchunger etc. All of them argued that since they belonged to a minority group with least representation in the NLA, their representatives should be accommodated in the cabinet or empowered with better portfolios to enable them to play bigger roles in their community development. On the other hand, the dominant groups also have their opinion that since they have more representatives, more from their group should be selected in the cabinet.
Therefore, redefining who is controlling what and how needs to be a constant and primary concern of our politics and economics in order to maintain social, political and economic harmony in a society having a remarkable diversity like ours. Otherwise the society risks itself in getting hijacked by the very persons commissioned to manage it, as they may eventually use government machinery to pursue their vested or tribal benefit alone.
Politics in a small yet diverse state like Nagaland must, therefore, try to reason with the democratic norms itself. For politics existed even before the word democracy was coined. Democracy, though regarded as the best form of government is not free from certain loopholes as legislations or allocation and distribution of resources etc. are often determined by the voice of the majority- having a tendency to ignore the genuine and legitimate claims of the minority groups. Hence, an inclusive politics coupled with balanced developmental strategies are required to quench, or even neutralize, preferential demands from competing groups.
As the 91th constitution amendment 2003 limits the strength of a council of ministers to 15 per cent of the total strength of legislators (or a maximum of 12 as in the case of smaller States) not all elected legislatures can be accommodated in the cabinet: hence, some has to be contented with parliamentary secretaries or other appointment as deemed appropriate by the chief minister.
And one thing where both the public and elected legislatures must keep in mind is that the delivery system does not depend on the portfolio allocation alone. The nature and pace of development will also depend upon the integrity, resourcefulness, transparency and leadership quality of the person holding public office and also upon the coordination and quality of workmanship carried out by subordinate agencies. And lastly, the cry for development can be realised only by creating a just environment conducive for growth, governed by an effective management, supported and cooperated by the general public. For when plenty is not enough, less would even be more miserable.
N Janbemo Humtsoe
janbemolotha@gmail.com
.JPG)
