Hopes of an end to the 30-year-long armed insurgency in India's northeastern state of Assam have brightened with leaders of the secessionist United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) expressing willingness to enter into unconditional talks with the government.
Last week, the group's founder-chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa, was released from jail - his bail application was not challenged by the government - paving the way for the start of a peace process. Several of Rajkhowa's jailed comrades including vice-chairman Pradip Gogoi, deputy commander-in-chief Raju Baruah, central publicity secretary Mithinga Daimari, cultural secretary Pranati Deka and adviser Bhimkanta Buragohain were released on bail earlier.
No date for the start of negotiations has been announced yet but the government's interlocutor, P C Haldar, a former Intelligence bureau chief, has confirmed that the government and the rebels are interested in negotiations. Should talks start, it will mark an important turning point in Assam's history. Like much of the other states in India's northeast, Assam has been wracked for decades by an assortment of conflicts - powerful secessionist insurgencies against the state, tribal movements for autonomy, and inter-tribal conflicts, among others. But it is the ULFA that has dominated and defined developments in the state for the past two decades. The rebel group was founded in April 1979 amidst a powerful "anti-foreigner" agitation in Assam led by the All Assam Students' Union (AASU) against an illegal influx from Bangladesh. Unlike the AASU's more moderate demands and methods, the ULFA's goal was to "liberate Assam through armed national liberation struggle from the clutches of the illegal occupation of India" and to "establish a sovereign independent Assam".
While the Assam Accord brought the anti-foreigner agitation to an end, culminating in a party formed out of the AASU leadership that contested elections and formed the government, the ULFA have remained active. The group's violence against the Indian state peaked in the 1990s, forcing the government to declare it a terrorist organization. Massive counterinsurgency operations through the 1990s failed to break the ULFA's back. The outfit was flush with funds raised through an arms and drugs network and extorting tea plantation companies. The ULFA also reportedly benefited immensely from largesse extended to it by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and sections of Bangladesh's security establishment. Close ties with other powerful insurgent groups in the region as well as sanctuaries in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan helped the ULFA's leaders and cadres escape India's counter-insurgency operations.
In the first decade of existence, the ULFA enjoyed popular support. That changed in the 1990s when its extortion and violent attacks on ordinary civilians eroded its mass base. The tide began to turn against the ULFA in 2003, when joint operations between Indian security forces and the Bhutan army resulted in ULFA fighters being flushed out from camps in Bhutan. Improved relations between India and Bangladesh, then had a significant impact on the ULFA's safe havens there. From November 2009 onwards, Bangladesh began handing over to Indian authorities a number of ULFA leaders, Rajkhowa, Baruah, and central committee members Chitrobon Hazarika and Sashadhar Choudhury were among them. Over the past year, Indian authorities reportedly began engaging the jailed ULFA leaders through civil society mediators on the question of a negotiated settlement. Its efforts have been successful except that ULFA's military commander Paresh Barua remains elusive. Barua, who was once believed to be hiding in Bangladesh, is said to be living now near the Myanmar-China border. He has repeatedly indicated that he is opposed to talks and has continued to stress ULFA's commitment to the goal of a separate state.
Whether Rajkhowa and Barua have fallen out is unclear. If they have, it is likely that Barua will unleash violence in the coming weeks and months to disrupt the talks. At the same time, Rajkhowa can be expected to use Barua's threat of reviving ULFA as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table. Until early 2001, ULFA said that it would engage in talks with the government only if these were held outside India, under the supervision of the United Nations and centering around its core demand of sovereignty of Assam. This was unacceptable to the government. In 2005, ULFA gave up two of these conditions but insisted on discussing the issue of Assam's sovereignty. That year, it appointed a People's Consultative Group (PCG), comprising 11 people from various walks of life to negotiate on its behalf with the government. Three rounds of dialogue with the government followed over a period of a year during which the government even announced a six-week long ceasefire with ULFA.
However, the peace process collapsed on September 26, 2006. The government called off its truce as both sides refused to budge from their positions - the ULFA wanted five of its jailed leaders released and the government wanted a written commitment from the outfit that it was indeed serious about peace. While the ULFA continued to attack and extort right through the so-called peace process of 2005-06, with the collapse of the talks, it accelerated the violence. The present attempt at peace talks has its roots in an important development in 2008. In June that year, it suffered a major split when the "Alpha” and "Charlie” companies of its crack "28th battalion” called a unilateral ceasefire.
It is said that the 2008 split in ULFA was the result of growing distance between ULFA's Assam based fighters and its leaders who were based in Bangladesh. The Assam-based leaders felt that those in Bangladesh were not in touch with the situation on the ground and had done nothing to address "critical issues of Assam, like the influx by illegal immigrants from Bangladesh". They felt that leaders like Rajkhowa and Barua were issuing orders from the comfort of safe havens abroad, when they were facing the heat on the ground in Assam. Mrinal Hazarika, a former commander of the 28th battalion who had been arrested in 2005, was said to have been instrumental in getting the disgruntled Assam-based fighters to abjure armed struggle and a separate state. Exploratory talks between this "pro-talks group" and the government followed to find ways to bring other ULFA leaders on board.
The arrests of senior ULFA leaders in Assam and Bangladesh in 2009 hastened this process. The ULFA is a banned outfit. Will the government lift the ban ahead of talks? "ULFA will have to formally give up its demand for sovereignty and abjure violence before steps can be taken to revoke the ban," Health and Family Welfare minister, who is also the government spokesperson, Himanta Biswa Sarma has said. At a public rally in Sibsagar, Rajkhowa spoke of an "honorable solution". He did not mention the sovereignty issue. But for Barua, who has repeatedly stressed that sovereignty remains a core demand, the others appear to have come around. An 18-point charter of demands submitted in March 2009 to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh by the "pro-talk ULFA Group" headed by Hazarika, Jiten Dutta and Prabal Neog made no reference to the sovereignty issue. "We have given up our original demand for sovereignty. We are now looking for an acceptable solution to our problems within the framework of the Indian constitution," Hazarika was reported to have said then. Analysts have said that his charter could form the basis of a peace formula. If it does, the government should have no problem conceding many of its demands.
There is a sticking point however. The first demand is full autonomy within the framework of the Indian constitution. "Is full autonomy to Assam supposed to cover Bodo, Karbi, Dimasa and other areas dominated by ethnic groups who already enjoy a fair degree of autonomy?" asks Wasbir Hussain, director of the Centre for Development and Peace Studies in Guwahati. In the strife-torn northeast demands of one ethnic group often collide with those of another, conceding one group's demands to push it to lay down arms often prompts another to turn to armed struggle. This then will be the challenge that the government will have to tackle: how to bring ULFA into the mainstream without pushing others to take up arms.
Officials say that this is not just about peace talks. The government has been engaged in talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland- Isak-Muivah in neighboring Nagaland since 1997. While the ceasefire has held it has not resolved the conflict. Delhi does not want a repeat of that story in Assam. They want ULFA's leaders to join mainstream politics. State assembly elections are due in Assam in May. All eyes are on Rajkhowa and his comrades. They could spring a surprise on Assam and Delhi by throwing their hats in the electoral ring.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.
Last week, the group's founder-chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa, was released from jail - his bail application was not challenged by the government - paving the way for the start of a peace process. Several of Rajkhowa's jailed comrades including vice-chairman Pradip Gogoi, deputy commander-in-chief Raju Baruah, central publicity secretary Mithinga Daimari, cultural secretary Pranati Deka and adviser Bhimkanta Buragohain were released on bail earlier.
No date for the start of negotiations has been announced yet but the government's interlocutor, P C Haldar, a former Intelligence bureau chief, has confirmed that the government and the rebels are interested in negotiations. Should talks start, it will mark an important turning point in Assam's history. Like much of the other states in India's northeast, Assam has been wracked for decades by an assortment of conflicts - powerful secessionist insurgencies against the state, tribal movements for autonomy, and inter-tribal conflicts, among others. But it is the ULFA that has dominated and defined developments in the state for the past two decades. The rebel group was founded in April 1979 amidst a powerful "anti-foreigner" agitation in Assam led by the All Assam Students' Union (AASU) against an illegal influx from Bangladesh. Unlike the AASU's more moderate demands and methods, the ULFA's goal was to "liberate Assam through armed national liberation struggle from the clutches of the illegal occupation of India" and to "establish a sovereign independent Assam".
While the Assam Accord brought the anti-foreigner agitation to an end, culminating in a party formed out of the AASU leadership that contested elections and formed the government, the ULFA have remained active. The group's violence against the Indian state peaked in the 1990s, forcing the government to declare it a terrorist organization. Massive counterinsurgency operations through the 1990s failed to break the ULFA's back. The outfit was flush with funds raised through an arms and drugs network and extorting tea plantation companies. The ULFA also reportedly benefited immensely from largesse extended to it by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and sections of Bangladesh's security establishment. Close ties with other powerful insurgent groups in the region as well as sanctuaries in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan helped the ULFA's leaders and cadres escape India's counter-insurgency operations.
In the first decade of existence, the ULFA enjoyed popular support. That changed in the 1990s when its extortion and violent attacks on ordinary civilians eroded its mass base. The tide began to turn against the ULFA in 2003, when joint operations between Indian security forces and the Bhutan army resulted in ULFA fighters being flushed out from camps in Bhutan. Improved relations between India and Bangladesh, then had a significant impact on the ULFA's safe havens there. From November 2009 onwards, Bangladesh began handing over to Indian authorities a number of ULFA leaders, Rajkhowa, Baruah, and central committee members Chitrobon Hazarika and Sashadhar Choudhury were among them. Over the past year, Indian authorities reportedly began engaging the jailed ULFA leaders through civil society mediators on the question of a negotiated settlement. Its efforts have been successful except that ULFA's military commander Paresh Barua remains elusive. Barua, who was once believed to be hiding in Bangladesh, is said to be living now near the Myanmar-China border. He has repeatedly indicated that he is opposed to talks and has continued to stress ULFA's commitment to the goal of a separate state.
Whether Rajkhowa and Barua have fallen out is unclear. If they have, it is likely that Barua will unleash violence in the coming weeks and months to disrupt the talks. At the same time, Rajkhowa can be expected to use Barua's threat of reviving ULFA as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table. Until early 2001, ULFA said that it would engage in talks with the government only if these were held outside India, under the supervision of the United Nations and centering around its core demand of sovereignty of Assam. This was unacceptable to the government. In 2005, ULFA gave up two of these conditions but insisted on discussing the issue of Assam's sovereignty. That year, it appointed a People's Consultative Group (PCG), comprising 11 people from various walks of life to negotiate on its behalf with the government. Three rounds of dialogue with the government followed over a period of a year during which the government even announced a six-week long ceasefire with ULFA.
However, the peace process collapsed on September 26, 2006. The government called off its truce as both sides refused to budge from their positions - the ULFA wanted five of its jailed leaders released and the government wanted a written commitment from the outfit that it was indeed serious about peace. While the ULFA continued to attack and extort right through the so-called peace process of 2005-06, with the collapse of the talks, it accelerated the violence. The present attempt at peace talks has its roots in an important development in 2008. In June that year, it suffered a major split when the "Alpha” and "Charlie” companies of its crack "28th battalion” called a unilateral ceasefire.
It is said that the 2008 split in ULFA was the result of growing distance between ULFA's Assam based fighters and its leaders who were based in Bangladesh. The Assam-based leaders felt that those in Bangladesh were not in touch with the situation on the ground and had done nothing to address "critical issues of Assam, like the influx by illegal immigrants from Bangladesh". They felt that leaders like Rajkhowa and Barua were issuing orders from the comfort of safe havens abroad, when they were facing the heat on the ground in Assam. Mrinal Hazarika, a former commander of the 28th battalion who had been arrested in 2005, was said to have been instrumental in getting the disgruntled Assam-based fighters to abjure armed struggle and a separate state. Exploratory talks between this "pro-talks group" and the government followed to find ways to bring other ULFA leaders on board.
The arrests of senior ULFA leaders in Assam and Bangladesh in 2009 hastened this process. The ULFA is a banned outfit. Will the government lift the ban ahead of talks? "ULFA will have to formally give up its demand for sovereignty and abjure violence before steps can be taken to revoke the ban," Health and Family Welfare minister, who is also the government spokesperson, Himanta Biswa Sarma has said. At a public rally in Sibsagar, Rajkhowa spoke of an "honorable solution". He did not mention the sovereignty issue. But for Barua, who has repeatedly stressed that sovereignty remains a core demand, the others appear to have come around. An 18-point charter of demands submitted in March 2009 to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh by the "pro-talk ULFA Group" headed by Hazarika, Jiten Dutta and Prabal Neog made no reference to the sovereignty issue. "We have given up our original demand for sovereignty. We are now looking for an acceptable solution to our problems within the framework of the Indian constitution," Hazarika was reported to have said then. Analysts have said that his charter could form the basis of a peace formula. If it does, the government should have no problem conceding many of its demands.
There is a sticking point however. The first demand is full autonomy within the framework of the Indian constitution. "Is full autonomy to Assam supposed to cover Bodo, Karbi, Dimasa and other areas dominated by ethnic groups who already enjoy a fair degree of autonomy?" asks Wasbir Hussain, director of the Centre for Development and Peace Studies in Guwahati. In the strife-torn northeast demands of one ethnic group often collide with those of another, conceding one group's demands to push it to lay down arms often prompts another to turn to armed struggle. This then will be the challenge that the government will have to tackle: how to bring ULFA into the mainstream without pushing others to take up arms.
Officials say that this is not just about peace talks. The government has been engaged in talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland- Isak-Muivah in neighboring Nagaland since 1997. While the ceasefire has held it has not resolved the conflict. Delhi does not want a repeat of that story in Assam. They want ULFA's leaders to join mainstream politics. State assembly elections are due in Assam in May. All eyes are on Rajkhowa and his comrades. They could spring a surprise on Assam and Delhi by throwing their hats in the electoral ring.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.
Source: AsiaTimes
