Morung Photo
Dr N Janbemo Humtsoe
Wokha
If we revisit the genesis of the Naga political struggle, it was never tribal, district-based, or state-centric. It was civilizational. The struggle was rooted in the existence, identity, and the continuity of the Naga people as a nation; not as tribes, districts, or states. It arose from a collective consciousness that the Nagas shared a common way of life, social systems, customary laws, land ownership patterns, village republics, oral history etc. that existed long before modern political boundaries were imposed.
Our struggle emerged from fundamental inquiries such as: who are we as a people? How do we govern ourselves in accordance with our customs and values? How do we safeguard our land, culture, and identity? These consciousness and struggles predated even the modern states of post-colonial India and Myanmar.
As early as 1929, when the Naga Club submitted its historic memorandum to the Simon Commission, the Nagas articulated a principled claim to be left alone to determine their own future. This was not a parochial demand tied to particular districts or tribes, but a collective assertion rooted in shared history, culture, and political consciousness. That consciousness later took shape into organized movements through the Naga National Council (NNC) and subsequently the NSCN formations.
Over the course of several decades, the Government of India tacitly recognized the distinctiveness of the Naga history and culture and engaged in negotiations at the highest political levels. Historical records indicate that in 1967, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reportedly offered the Naga delegation to “take everything but sovereignty,” to which FGN leader Kughato Sukhai responded, “I shall not take everything but sovereignty.” Reliable reports also suggest that India was, at various stages, open to exploring supra-state arrangements, including shared competencies and specialized political mechanisms, among others. But those opportunities were also apparently missed.
So, if we observe the FNTA from the broader lens of Naga political journey, the FNTA of February 5, 2026 appears as a settlement for far less than what history had once placed on the table. It will be even more troubling if New Delhi considers the FNTA as a solution to one of the longest and most complex political struggles in the Indian subcontinent. But perhaps not, because according to the ENPO President, the demand for separate statehood remained intact, describing FNTA as only the first step towards that larger goal.
The idea of Nagaland
Veteran Naga leaders like Dr. S. C. Jamir have repeatedly argued that the creation of Nagaland state was one of the best political outcomes of the Naga political struggle. That might be true, but throughout his long political career, he has rarely gone beyond the boundaries of the present Nagaland state while speaking about the Naga issue. As recently as January 2026, Dr. Jamir remarked that “Nagas of Nagaland will remain in Nagaland, Nagas of Manipur in Manipur, and Nagas of Arunachal in Arunachal.” Now, if the statehood demand for Eastern Nagaland were to be granted, his statement will probably end with “Nagas of Eastern Nagaland will live in Eastern Nagaland.”
On the surface, this statement merely describes the existing political reality. However, it also conveys a deeper and more troubling message that the Nagas are neither socially nor politically united.
Such an outlook, whether intentional or not, reinforces the very condition that others have historically preferred: a fragmented Naga society, divided along administrative and territorial lines.
Yes, political realities have not allowed the Nagas to live under one political administration. That is a fact we have been living with for decades. But political failure need not translate into social surrender. If political unity was difficult, we could have worked for at least social and cultural unity. Instead, what we witness is the steady growth of vested politics, that is the politics of “us” versus “them,” of this tribe versus that tribe, of whose area is more developed and whose is not. This mindset has divided the Naga society from within.
Governance itself has increasingly come to be influenced by tribal considerations, where influence and numbers matter more than fairness. This tribalistic approach to governance has placed weaker and less influential communities at a permanent disadvantage. It breeds resentment, deepens mistrust, and creates a feeling that the system is not meant for everyone.
Under such conditions, it would be wrong to assume that only the Eastern Nagas are unhappy. If this pattern continues, other Naga tribes and regions will also begin to ask uncomfortable questions and perhaps demand different political arrangements for themselves. In such eventualities, even the idea of Nagaland will cease to exist.
Progress with Unity
For many Nagas including myself, FNTA is seen as a victory for it recognizes the long-standing neglect and underdevelopment. These grievances are real and legitimate. But redressal of neglect is not the same as resolution of a political issue. From a wider political lens, FNTA does not advance the Naga political aspiration; it reduces it. It shifts the discourse from peoplehood to territorial management, from collective future to localized administration.
Administrative arrangements such as the Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority may address immediate governance gaps, but they do not substitute a comprehensive political settlement of the Naga issue. The Naga political movement did not arise from district or regional level grievances, but from a collective assertion of identity that predates the present state boundaries. Hence, any path that narrows this collective imagination into separate administrative compartments weakens the political aspirations of the Nagas as a whole.
This is not an argument against addressing Eastern Naga aspirations. Rather what has been generously offered should be accepted. However, we must be mindful of the fact that even though FNTA may deliver funds and development, it does not deliver political resolution. It only addresses the symptoms, not the causes.
For a people who once told the British Empire they wished to be left alone, the danger today is not suppression, it is gradual fragmentation through division. Without unity, even the idea of Nagaland will struggle to survive. In the strategic landscape of India’s Northeast, Naga unity is not an emotional slogan but real leverage. Without unity, our aspirations become meaningless; with unity, we will be respected and can reshape our future.
